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Dealing with time in the quantitative study of conflict 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the ways in which the quantitative literature on the onset of 
violent conflict deals with the passage of time.  We argue that current approaches are 
insufficient for dealing with the methodological challenges raised by this issue.  In 
particular, we argue that quantitative innovations have focused on resolving problems 
of ‘relative time’, relating a given year observation to previous year observation within 
a single case.  But this has not addressed the more problematic epistemological 
question about the passage of absolute time.  The paper suggests a number of 
routes towards addressing this problem. 
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Dealing with time in the quantitative study of conflict 
By Graham Brown & Arnim Langer 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
There is increasing awareness in the econometric literature on conflict that time 
represents a problem.  Logit and other standard OLS regression analyses using 
pooled data based on ‘country-year’ observations are problematic because the 
underlying regression model is based on the assumption that observations are not 
interdependent whereas, quite clearly, they are.   
 
In this paper, we discuss the ways in which problems of time have been addressed in 
quantitative analyses of civil conflict, and explore possible ways in which this line of 
analysis may be extended.  We contend that the response to the problem of time has 
mainly been to find essentially technical ways of circumventing or at least minimizing 
the problem of inter-dependent observations.  While a useful step forward, this 
leaves unaddressed fundamental epistemological questions which are raised by an 
examination of the role of time in quantitative conflict studies.   
 
To make our case, we first need to distinguish between two different 
conceptualizations of the passage of time: absolute time and relative time.  By 
absolute time, we mean the ways in which quantitative studies handle particular 
historical events or periods of time, that is to say variables that could be (partially) 
coded for on the basis of a variable for the date of occurrence.  A typical example 
here is the ‘Cold War dummy’ that is included in many analyses (e.g. Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004), and which is typically coded as 1 for all years between 1945 and 
1988, and 0 for 1989 and all subsequent years.  By relative time, we are thankfully 
not suggesting that econometrics take into account Einsteinian physics of motion.  
Rather, in our terms, relative time refers to statistical techniques and variables that 
either relate country-year observations within a single country-case to each other, or 
that relate country-year observations to a common ‘origin point’ for that country-case, 
but without reference to the ‘real’ time in which these events occur.  A count of 
‘peace years’ prior to each observation (i.e. the number of year preceding the current 
year in which the country has not experienced armed conflict) is a common example 
of relative time (Urdal 2006).  
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But this leads us to a third issue related to time, namely when does the main 
dependent variable, a conflict ‘event’, start and when does it end?  Essentially, our 
claim is that the ‘event’ of violent conflict or civil war which is tested for in 
econometric studies is not sufficiently well operationalized.  And, by using a simple 
casualty per year definition of violent conflict or civil war, conflict datasets often 
artificially divide one and the same conflict into different time periods.  While this is 
particularly problematic for quantitative studies on the duration of conflict or on 
conflict recurrence, it also poses potentially serious problems for quantitative studies 
into the causes of violent conflict.  
 
To examine these issues, we make use of the extensive replication datasets 
available from previous studies through journal and personal websites.  We make 
particularly extensive use of the Fearon and Laitin dataset (henceforth FL) developed 
for their 2003 APSR article on ‘insurgency, ethnicity, and civil war’ (Fearon and Laitin 
2003a; Fearon and Laitin 2003b), which remains a touchstone for the quantitative 
analysis of civil war.  Fearon and Laitin develop an ‘insurgency’ model of civil war, 
arguing that the bulk of civil war in the post-Second World War era has been 
constituted by ‘insurgency or rural guerrilla warfare’, which has been ‘harnessed’ to 
various political agendas.  They contend that the determining factors that explain the 
incidence of insurgency are, rather, the underlying possibilities for insurgency, which 
they measure in geographical terms – the extent of mountainous and non-contiguous 
territory in the country – and political terms.  Their empirical analysis, they conclude, 
shows that ‘the conditions that favour insurgency – in particular, state weakness 
marked by poverty, a large population, and instability – are better predictors of which 
countries are at risk for civil war than are indicators of ethnic or religious diversity or 
measures of grievance such as economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil 
liberties, or state discrimination against minority religions or languages’.  The FL 
dataset, which is one of the most extensive annualized conflict datasets and is 
available online (Fearon and Laitin 2003b), has subsequently been used as the basis 
for many other econometric studies that typically append one or more extra variables 
to the FL model to test their significance. 
 
In using this dataset to make our arguments, we wish to make it clear that we do not 
intend this paper to be read as an attack on this article, which has made a valuable 
contribution to the literature on civil war.  We use it rather because it is such an 
extensive dataset that it provides fertile ground for testing the impact of different 
approaches to operationalizing the passage of time.  The paper proceeds as follows.   
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In the next section, we will deal with the issue of relative time, and Section 4 
subsequently focuses on the issue of absolute time.  The fifth section then deals with 
the issue of how violent conflicts and civil wars are usually operationalized and how 
this affects econometric results. 
 
 
2. Plus ça change: taking time relatively seriously 
 
Econometric studies of the incidence of civil war typically use the “country-year” as 
the unit of analysis – that is to say, they comprise a dataset in which each row 
represents a given country in a given year, and which then also includes a variety of 
other data for that year thought to be likely to impact upon the incidence of civil war, 
such as GDP per capita, level of democracy, and so forth.  Some or all of these 
variables are often lagged by one or more years to reduce problems of identifying 
causality – a low level of GDP per capita, for instance, is widely found to be a strong 
predictor of civil war, but war itself also usually reduces GDP per capita significantly.  
Hence, for instance, if war breaks out at the beginning of a country-year, this is likely 
to reduce GDP for that year, which would artificially increase the significance of low 
GDP in the regression.  To obviate this problem, the previous year’s data is 
frequently used, for instance the country-year observation “Ghana 1972” would 
contain the GDP data for Ghana in 1971.  Various regression models, discussed 
further below, are then used to examine which variables are most strongly correlated 
with the likelihood of civil war onset, most commonly the pooled logit model, which is 
suitable for a dependent variable such as civil war onset that takes only two values: 0 
(no civil war onset) and 1 (civil war onset).  This has proved problematic, however, 
because one of the underlying assumptions of the logit model is that the individual 
observations making up the dataset are completely independent of each other. But, 
for instance, treating political instability and violent conflict in ‘D.R. Congo in 2002’ as 
a completely separate observation from ‘D.R. Congo in 2003’ seems highly 
unrealistic.  
   
Until quite recently, the most common way of addressing, though not resolving 
completely, the issue of the interdependence of country-year observations within 
conflict panel data was through the introduction of a variable that measured, in effect, 
the passage of absolute time between the country-year observation in question and 
an imputed ‘foundation point’ of the country-case, usually indexed to the formation of 
the state in question (Fearon and Laitin 2003a), the most recent major regime 
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transition (Gates, et al. 2006; Saideman, et al. 2002), or duration of peace preceding 
the country-year observation (Urdal 2006).   
 
The passage of relative time is operationalized in a number of ways.  The simplest is 
a range of dummy variables.  With many conflict hypotheses suggesting that newly-
formed states or states that have recently undergone regime transition are more 
vulnerable to internal conflict, a dummy variable that captures the ‘newness’ of the 
state or regime in question is common, such as Fearon and Laitin’s ‘New State’ 
dummy variable, which takes the value 1 in the first and second years after a country 
gains independence and 0 in all other years.  A more unusual use of a relative time 
dummy is Saideman et al (2002), who use an ‘enduring regime’ dummy, coded 1 for 
all observations where the regime has endured for 20 years or more and 0 otherwise.  
While, as we shall see shortly, such dummy variables are typically highly significant, 
they are clearly arbitrarily bounded – why is a 19-year old regime so different from a 
20-year old regime? 
 
Continuous measures of the passage of relative time are less obviously open to 
accusations of arbitrariness, and are widely used both to measure ‘peace years’ – 
the number of years for each country-year since the country-case last experienced 
conflict – or ‘polity duration’ – the equivalent number of years since a significant 
regime change (e.g. Hegre et al 2001; Urdal 2006), usually operationalized as a 
change in the Polity index score.  Typically, this is transformed into a ‘decay’ function 
using the formula exp((0 - years in peace)/X)1, where X is a variable representing the 
presumed ‘half-life’ of conflict/political instability legacy, i.e. the number of years after 
which the impact of a previous conflict halves.  Although there is some degree of 
arbitrariness in the selection of a value for X – Østby (2008) uses a value of X=1, for 
instance, while Urdal (2006) uses X=4 – the different decay functions are highly 
correlated.   
 
Table 1 replicates Urdal’s study of the impact of demographic ‘Youth Bulges’ using 
different values for X.  While the model as a whole remains broadly the same 
whatever value is given to X, some interesting trends emerge as X is increased.  
Firstly, as X increases, the significance of the peace-year decay function decreases, 
as does the overall fit of the model, although the peace-year function remains by far 
the most significant predictor in all models.  As X increases, there are consistent 
                                               
1
 This notation taken from Urdal 2006. 
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downward trends in the significance of two of the main explanatory variables Urdal 
invokes – the presence of demographic youth bulges and the overall population size 
– and a consistent increase in the significance of one of his control variables, the 
Polity-squared index.  It is to Urdal’s credit that he did not simply pick the value of X 
which would have given the strongest results: a value of X=1 would have produced a 
model with stronger z-statistics for his main explanatory variables and a pseudo-R2 
some two percentage points higher.  But this nonetheless raises uncomfortable 
question about the impact of relative time on regression results, particularly as it 
comes out as the strongest predictor, since the results are dependent on the choice 
of an essentially arbitrary time period. 
 
Table 1: Re-estimation of Urdal model with varying time decay function 
 X=1 X=2 X=3 X=4 X=5 X=6 
Youth Bulge 0.057 *** 0.052 *** 0.049 *** 0.047 *** 0.046 ** 0.045 ** 
 (3.00)  (2.75)  (2.62)  (2.53)  (2.45)  (2.38)  
Population (ln) 0.227 *** 0.213 *** 0.207 *** 0.204 *** 0.201 *** 0.198 *** 
 (3.97)  (3.76)  (3.66)  (3.60)  (3.55)  (3.51)  
IMR 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 
 (2.70)  (2.61)  (2.61)  (2.64)  (2.68)  (2.73)  
Polity 0.014  0.012  0.012  0.012  0.012  0.012  
 (1.02)  (0.88)  (0.84)  (0.84)  (0.84)  (0.86)  
Polity-sq. -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** 
 (-3.55)  (-3.72)  (-3.77)  (-3.78)  (-3.79)  (-3.79)  
Peace years 3.966 *** 2.644 *** 2.161 *** 1.920 *** 1.776 *** 1.678 *** 
 (8.65)  (7.47)  (6.80)  (6.49)  (6.31)  (6.20)  
_cons -7.345 *** -7.040 *** -6.934 *** -6.870 *** -6.824 *** -6.788 *** 
 (-8.26)  (-8.03)  (-7.92)  (-7.86)  (-7.81)  (-7.77)  
N 5331  5331  5331  5331  5331  5331  
Pseudo-R2 0.1072  0.0922  0.0880  0.0863  0.0855  0.0850  
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Urdal (2006) replication dataset.  Notes:  z-stat in brackets; X=4 
replicates Urdal’s results. 
 
 
In fact, in many econometric studies, relative time variables are the strongest, or 
among the strongest, predictors that result from the analysis (Carey 2007; Fearon 
and Laitin 2003a; Urdal 2006).  Moreover, the size of the coefficient is typically large.  
Figure 1 demonstrates this graphically, showing the significance of the ‘New State’ 
dummy to the FL model, which codes for the first two years of a state’s existence, by 
graphing the post-estimation impact of country size (one of the other main 
explanatory variables in the FL model), on the predicted likelihood of conflict onset.  
The graph disaggregates by the New State dummy, holding all other variables at 
their mean value.2  The difference in results is striking; even the smallest ‘new states’ 
have a predicted mean conflict onset likelihood of around 2%, whereas all but the 
                                               
2
 Here and elsewhere, post-estimation graphs have been generated using the postrgr3 
addition to Stata developed by Michael Mitchell of UCLA.  Unless otherwise stated, these 
curves are all generated by holding all other variables at their mean value. 
CRISE Working Paper No. 66 
8 
 
very largest non-‘new states’ have predicted conflict likelihood of less than 2%.  
Table 2 explores this impact further by re-testing the FL model for different 
specifications of the ‘new state’ dummy, where Y is the number of years post-
independence for which the dummy is coded 1 (hence, the original FL specification 
equates to Y=2).  As in the Urdal re-test above, the significance of this relative time 
dummy drops off as its legacy time is increased, but for the FL dataset the effect is 
much more rapid and drastic.  In the original specification, Y=2, the new state dummy 
is the most significant predictor in the results, but as Y is increased, this drops off 
rapidly, and at Y=5, the variable is of only marginal significance.3  This is particularly 
worth noting because typically theories of regime transition see the first election 
under a new regime, usually held after four to five years, as a key hurdle at which 
conflict often (re-)emerges (e.g. Gates, et al. 2006); we might thus expect a ‘new 
state’ dummy to retain its significance at least for five years. 
 
Table 2: FL re-tests with varying definitions of 'new state' 
 Y=2 Y=3 Y=4 Y=5 Y=6 
Ongoing war -0.974 *** -1.002 *** -1.009 *** -1.004 *** -1.004 *** 
 (-3.04)  (-3.18)  (-3.21)  (-3.20)  (-3.19)  
GDP per capita (lag) -0.344 *** -0.350 *** -0.356 *** -0.355 *** -0.355 *** 
 (-4.79)  (-0.49)  (-4.90)  (-4.88)  (-4.87)  
Population (log. and lag) 0.263 *** 0.256 *** 0.247 *** 0.245 *** 0.245 *** 
 (3.62)  (3.52)  (3.39)  (3.37)  (3.36)  
Mountainous Territory 0.219 ** 0.218 ** 0.219 ** 0.221 ** 0.221 ** 
 (2.58)  (2.58)  (2.59)  (2.61)  (2.61)  
Non-contiguous Territory 0.443  0.459  0.476  0.473  0.471  
 (1.62)  (1.67)  (1.73)  (1.71)  (1.70)  
Oil 0.858 *** 0.859 *** 0.873 *** 0.876 *** 0.877 *** 
 (3.07)  (3.09)  (3.14)  (3.15)  (3.16)  
New State 1.709 *** 1.162 *** 0.772 ** 0.645 * 0.567  
 (5.05)  (3.54)  (2.38)  (2.11)  (1.95)  
Instability 0.618 ** 0.551 ** 0.412 * 0.498 * 0.494 * 
 (2.63)  (2.36)  (2.21)  (2.15)  (2.14)  
Polity 0.021  0.022  0.024  0.024  0.024  
 (1.24)  (1.34)  (1.43)  (1.44)  (1.46)  
Ethnic Frac. 0.166  0.196  0.200  0.199  0.194  
 (0.45)  (0.53)  (0.54)  (0.53)  (0.52)  
Religious Frac. 0.285  0.300  0.338  0.349  0.352  
 (0.56)  (0.59)  (0.67)  (0.69)  (0.70)  
Constant -6.731 *** -6.633 *** -6.522 *** -6.509 *** -6.513 *** 
 (-9.15)  (-9.03)  (-8.88)  (-8.85)  (-8.82)  
N 6327  6327  6327  6327  6327  
Pseudo-R2 0.1080  0.0995  0.0947  0.0938  0.0933  
Source: Authors’ calculations from FL replication dataset.  Original FL model equates to Y=2 
 
 
                                               
3
 Replacing the ‘new state’ dummy with a time decay function likewise does not substantially 
affect the significance of the main explanatory variables and the decay function itself is only 
marginally significant, whatever the value of X.  Results are not reproduced here for space. 
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Figure 1: Post-estimation impact of population size on conflict incidence in FL model, 
disaggregated by 'New State' dummy 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on FL replication dataset 
 
An alternative approach to handling relative time, adopted in a number of recent 
studies, is to utilize a different regression equation, demonstrated for the FL model in 
Table 3.  The most commonly used is the Cox proportional hazard model.  The Cox 
hazard model, widely used in medical research to estimate survival times follow 
disease interventions, represents a useful advance in dealing with relative time 
because it links country-year observations within the country-case, and handles 
‘censored’ cases – those which ‘exit’ the study without ‘failure’, but which may 
nonetheless fail in the future – more appropriately.  While use of the Cox method 
represents a methodological improvement, however, it typically has remarkably little 
impact on model results (see Column 2 in Table 3).4  Given the logit results 
discussed above, which suggest a very clear role for relative time, this may seem 
strange, but an answer can be found in contrasting the particular assumptions of the 
Cox model with these logit findings.  Putting aside for a minute the issue of problems 
in the operationalization of the dependent variable, typical logit findings suggest a 
strongly significant but rapidly diminishing legacy of a ‘foundational event’, such as 
war or the creation of a new state, on the likelihood of subsequent conflict.  But this is 
unlikely to show up in a Cox regression because one of the assumptions behind the 
                                               
4
 Re-estimations using the Cox model were also performed on Urdal (2006) and Walter 
(2005).  Both re-tests also produced no significant changes in outcome. 
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Cox hazard model is that the impact of the independent variables on the likelihood of 
survival does not vary over time (hence, the proportional hazard model).  In other 
words, while the Cox hazard model usefully ties together successive years within 
country cases, it does so at the cost of assuming that the impact of independent 
variables does not vary across (relative) time.  The medical analogy is useful here; if 
we consider democratization as an ‘intervention’ which may reduce the risk of conflict 
(assuming a simple binary value 1=democracy, 0=no democracy), the Cox model 
tests the strength of this intervention across time-linked within-country observations, 
but assumes that this impact is constant – if democracy reduces the likelihood of 
conflict by 5 per cent after 1 year, it will also do so after 2 years, 3 years, and so 
forth. 
 
Alternative survival models are available that posit differential impacts over time 
between the independent variable and the likelihood of survival.  Gates et al (2006) 
use a log-linear survival ratio function that assumes initially increasing and then 
decreasing risk.  Here, however, one must specify in advance the expected 
relationship.  Column 3 in Table 3 replicates the FL model using this function.  Again, 
the model remains largely unchanged.  The value of gamma (<1.0), estimated by the 
regression programme, indicates that the hazard function is indeed distributed log-
linearly, initially increasing and then decreasing.   
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Table 3: FL Model Re-estimates 
 
Logit Cox 
Survival 
Ratio 
Model I 
Ongoing war -0.974 *** 1.856 * -0.860 ** 
 (-3.04)  (2.14)  (-2.55)  
GDP per capita (lag) -0.344 *** 1.345 *** -0.338 *** 
 (-4.79)  (5.01)  (-4.55)  
Population (log. and lag) 0.263 *** 0.798 *** 0.238 *** 
 (3.62)  (-3.17)  (3.30)  
Mountainous Territory 0.219 ** 0.834 ** 0.214 ** 
 (2.58)  (-2.49)  (2.56)  
Non-contiguous Territory 0.443  0.845  0.360  
 (1.62)  (-0.66)  (1.29)  
Oil 0.858 *** 0.464 *** 0.797 *** 
 (3.07)  (-2.82)  (2.87)  
New State 1.709 *** 0.163 *** 1.561 *** 
 (5.05)  (-7.06)  (2.70)  
Instability 0.618 ** 0.561 ** 0.559 ** 
 (2.63)  (2.53)  (2.38)  
Polity 0.021  0.979  0.023  
 (1.24)  (-1.45)  (1.34)  
Ethnic Frac. 0.166  1.019  0.109  
 (0.45)  (0.06)  (0.29)  
Religious Frac. 0.285  0.805  0.281  
 (0.56)  (-0.50)  (0.56)  
Constant -6.731 ***     
 (-9.15)      
Gamma     0.654 *** 
     (-4.59)  
N 6327  6303  6303  
L.Likelihood -480.4  -237.5  -474.6  
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on FL replication dataset. Notes: Cox model give proportional 
hazards, and hence does not produce an overall constant; survival ratio model gives estimated time 
ratios for survival, such that coefficients greater than 1 indicated an increased chance of survival (i.e. a 
lower risk of war). 
 
We have argued in this section, then, that recent attempts to control for the problem 
of passage of time and the interdependence of observations in econometric studies 
of civil war have utilized a variety of techniques that represent important 
methodological advances but that (fortunately enough) do not appear to impact 
significantly upon the results of the models tested.  They do, however, point to the 
particular importance of the immediate legacy of the ‘foundational event’ for the 
country-case as a major determinant of conflict.  We return to this issue in section 4.  
First, we will deal with a second problem – that all these techniques, while 
successfully incorporating the impact of relative time, do not address more 
fundamental epistemological problems relating to the passage of absolute time. 
 
 
3. Wie es eigentlich war: taking time absolutely seriously  
 
Taking absolute time seriously, we will suggest here, entails a much more radical 
shift in the underlying ontologies of the models we produce and test.  We rarely 
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actually address the ontological assumptions on which quantitative analyses are 
based.  We can draw an analogy here with the debates over the postmodern ‘attack’ 
on history.  Mary Fulbrook has argued that it is a common but misguided belief 
among practising historians to think it is possible to ignore these philosophical 
debates over the nature and reliability of historical inquiry in favour of just getting on 
with ‘”doing history”, exploring the archives, trying to find out as best they can “what 
really happened” or “how it really was” [wie es eigentlich war, in Ranke’s famous 
dictum]’ (Fulbrook 2002: p.4). They are misguided, she argues, because they will, 
nonetheless, inevitably be ‘working within bodies of assumptions of which they may 
be more or less aware’ (Fulbrook 2002: p.4).  One gets the impression that some 
quantitative studies of conflict proceed in a similar manner, “exploring the data” to 
find out “how it really is”.  Neither is this analogy to historiographical debate entirely in 
vain, as we want to suggest later that it may be more productive for quantitative 
analysis to be thought of as a form of historical inquiry.   
 
So, how can we characterize the (implicit) ontology of conflict underlying mainstream 
quantitative analysis?  Quantitative analyses of conflict incidence typically generate 
or test positivist ‘law-like’ propositions about the conditions that predispose towards 
conflict.  Combining country-year observations into panel data over as extended a 
period as possible generates conclusions that are held to be valid for at least that 
time period as a whole.  In reality, however, conclusions drawn are rarely expressed 
even with such limitations; they are expressed as general statements along the lines 
of ‘variable X has been shown to increase/decrease the likelihood of civil war’.  The 
fact that these propositions are expressed probabilistically – for instance, ceteris 
paribus, a lower GDP per capita will not necessarily lead to civil war, but does leave 
a country more vulnerable to civil war – renders them no less positivist.   
 
Our intention here is not to launch a full-blooded attack on positivism in social 
science; this debate has been engaged with far more vigour and insight on both 
sides than we can muster here.  Our plea, rather, is that we must at least take the 
acknowledged limitations of such an ontological stance seriously, and a key issue 
here relates precisely to the passage of time and the extent to which such ‘law-like 
propositions’ can be taken to hold over the longue durée.  Few modern philosophers 
of social science would still defend Hempel’s stand on the ‘necessity’ of ‘extensive 
use of universal hypotheses’ in social scientific research (Hempel 1942: p.48); 
modern sentiments seem, rather, more in line with Giddens’ (1979) assertion that 
such generalizations as we can make in the social sciences are historically bounded.  
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Yet the implication of most econometric studies of civil war is precisely that there are 
such ‘universal’ time-independent causes of civil war, however probabilistic they may 
be.  A notable exception here worth considering is Ted Gurr and Will Moore’s early 
analysis of the Minorities At Risk dataset (Gurr and Moore 1997), which we discuss 
further below.   
 
At this point, we should address a possible objection the claims made here.  Surely, it 
might be claimed, many studies do indeed take the passage of absolute time into 
consideration, as witnessed by the ‘Cold War dummy’ we referred to earlier.  Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004), for instance, include such a dummy – although, as we discuss 
below, giving it a rather counter-intuitive interpretation – and find it insignificant in 
explaining the incidence of civil war, while Bethany Lacina (2006) finds it a significant 
correlate of the severity rather than incidence of conflict.  Gates et al (2006) conduct 
a longue durée study of regime duration that includes five different dummies for 
successive four-decade periods between 1800 and 2000, all of which yield significant 
results.  However, the inclusion of absolute time dummies in other datasets appears 
to have little impact upon results, as shown in Table 4, which shows the FL model in 
their original specification (Model I) and re-run with the addition of a Cold War 
dummy (cw), coded 1 for the years 1945-1988, and 0 for the year 1989 and onwards 
(Model II).  The Cold War dummy is marginally significant (P>|z|=0.036), and its 
inclusion has only minor impacts on the significance of two other variables: the 
dummy variable for geographic non-contiguity which creeps just within normally 
accepted bounds of significance (P>|z|=0.049), while the variable for political 
instability loses some significance.  Figure 2 shows the post-estimation graphing of 
the impact of population size on conflict incidence broken down by the Cold War 
dummy. 
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Table 4: FL Replication, models 1-2 
 I II 
warl -0.954 *** -1.038 *** 
 (0.314)  (0.318)  
gdpenl -0.344 *** -0.363 *** 
 (0.072)  (0.074)  
lpopl1 0.263 *** 0.258 *** 
 (0.073)  (0.073)  
lmtnest 0.219 ** 0.219 *** 
 (0.085)  (0.084)  
ncontig 0.443  0.549 * 
 (0.274)  (0.279)  
Oil 0.858 *** 0.798 *** 
 (0.279)  (0.282)  
nwstate 1.709 *** 1.720 *** 
 (0.339)  (0.337)  
instab 0.618 *** 0.566 ** 
 (0.235)  (0.237)  
polity2l 0.021  0.015  
 (0.017)  (0.017)  
ethfrac 0.166  0.121  
 (0.373)  (0.374)  
relfrac 0.285  0.185  
 (0.509)  (0.511)  
cw   -0.492 * 
   (0.235)  
_cons -6.731 *** -6.227  
 (0.736)  (0.771)  
Pseudo R 0.108  0.112  
N 6327  6327  
 
 
 
0.
0%
1.
0%
2.
0%
3.
0%
4.
0%
Es
tim
at
e
d 
pr
o
ba
bi
lity
 
of
 
civ
il w
a
r
6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0
Population(log.)
Post-Cold War Cold War
 
Figure 2: Post-estimation of Cold War dummy for FL model 
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If the inclusion of absolute time dummies typically has statistical significance without 
seriously affecting the significance of other variables in the model this, it might surely 
be claimed, is job done.  Not quite, and here’s why.  Absolute time dummies such as 
the Cold War dummy simply introduce an extra variable or variables into the vector of 
predictors of conflict likelihood, which tell us whether there was a statistically 
significant ‘extra’ (positive or negative) chance of conflict, ceteris paribus, during the 
particular period.5  For interpretation purposes, this is highly unsatisfactory; it does 
not give us any idea why the chances of conflict were higher (or lower) during this 
period, unless we indulge in speculative assignment of interpretations; Collier and 
Hoeffler, for instance, interpret their Cold War dummy as a proxy for the availability of 
outside funding to rebel organizations, but this is surely only one of many possible 
impacts of the Cold War – and not even, it seems to us, a particularly important or 
strong one.  Indeed, if we are in the business of searching for generalizations 
invariant of absolute time, we would ideally find other independent variables that 
were correspondingly higher or lower during the Cold War and that, when entered 
into the regression, render the Cold War dummy insignificant.  Put this way, within 
the context of a quest for absolute time-invariant generalizations, statistically 
significant absolute time dummies can be seen as circumstantial evidence of 
‘missing’ variables.   
 
But what if there was something about the Cold War period that impacted upon 
conflict incidence that defies disaggregation into country-year-level socio-economic 
observations – for instance the Realist ‘bipolar’ configuration of the international 
system?  If this were the case, even the most exhaustive datasets would not be able 
to render the Cold War dummy insignificant.  We might then simply take the Cold 
War dummy at face value, but give it a more theoretical interpretation – as, for 
instance, a ‘bipolar international system dummy’.  But this still strikes us as 
somewhat unsatisfactory, for two reasons.  Firstly, as we have already alluded to, 
such absolute time dummies are open to a whole range of reasonable interpretations 
and the data do not really provide us with a way of preferring one interpretation to 
others.  The Cold War dummy may seem intuitively interpretable, but what about 
such dummies as the Gates et al five-fold four-decade dummies?  These are much 
harder to pin to a reasonable intuitive theoretical interpretation.  Moreover, it seems 
unreasonable to attribute the significance of these dummies to the specific time-
periods, given their arbitrary definitions.  Surely, however, the same thing could be 
                                               
5
 This ‘extra’ chance is, of course, subject to transformation by the regression equation as 
depicted in Figure 2. 
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said of the Cold War dummy.  From a statistical perspective, all such dummies really 
tells us is that there was (or, if insignificant, wasn’t) a statistically higher (or lower) 
chance of conflict onset between time t1 and t2.   
 
Moreover, they don’t allow for the interesting possibility that the passage of absolute 
time might not only be reflected in ceteris paribus, plus or minus, additional risks of 
conflict, but that the significance or even polarity of other independent variables may 
shift over time.  What if, for instance, there was something about the configuration of 
the international system during the Cold War that meant that oil-exporting countries 
were more prone to civil war (say, in a plausible interpretation along 
Collier/Hoeffleresque lines, because the major powers competed for access to 
petrochemical resources by sponsoring rebel groups in resource-rich countries not 
politically affiliated to them) but the post-Cold War era rendered the same countries 
less prone to civil war (say, because after the end of the ideological conflict of the 
cold war, all major powers found it less risky to compete for access to resources 
simply by competing to provide institutional and developmental support to the 
incumbent government of resource-rich countries, whatever their political affiliation).  
This type of absolute time scenario would, ceteris paribus, be likely to produce 
diametrically opposed results for an oil exporting variable if tested separately on the 
Cold War and post-Cold War periods of absolute time, something which would be 
entirely missed if absolute time were only included through a Cold War dummy. 
 
This leads us to our second point, which is that by adopting an (implicit) ontology that 
privileges time-invariant generalizations and thus providing such post facto 
‘theoretical’ interpretations of statistically significant absolute time dummies, we are 
in fact closing ourselves off to potentially fruitful and interesting avenues of inquiry.  
The question of why there was a significantly lower chance of conflict during the Cold 
War is surely much more interesting than simply the satisfaction at having ‘explained’ 
the passage of absolute time through the use of a dummy variable.  The prospect 
that even some of our strongest findings of correlates of conflict may not hold as valid 
now as they did in the past, or vice versa, should be tantalizing, rather than a matter 
of concern.  This means taking the passage of absolute time much more seriously.   
 
One way of getting a glimpse at the possible impact on the passage of absolute time 
on econometric results is simply to re-run existing models over a restricted period of 
time.  Here, we replicate the FL model, using the basic logit configuration, on 
successive rolling 20-year periods, i.e. for the 20 years beginning 1945, for the 20 
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years beginning 1946, and so on up to the period 1980-1999.  Figure 3 shows the 
resulting z-stats for four of the main independent variables which have a high level of 
significance in the FL model – oil dependency, GDP per capita, population size, and 
political instability. It is important to note that as the z-stat is a function of, among 
other things, the number of cases under observation, it would not be appropriate to 
compare these results directly with the z-stats for the original FL model, as the latter 
obviously includes many more observations – around 6,000 versus between 1,500 
and 2,000 for each of the periodized re-tests.  It seems reasonable, however, to 
compare across these time-bounded periodizations, as they consist of broadly similar 
numbers of observations and, indeed, largely overlap in the actual observations 
included.   
 
GDP per capita, which is one of the strongest predictors of civil war in virtually all 
econometric models including FL (cf. Hegre and Sambanis 2006), retains the normal 
benchmark of statistical significance (|z|>2) in every period, with a brief exception for 
the 1950-1969 periodization.  Moreover, there is a clear increasing trend; later 
periods see considerably greater significance for this variable than earlier periods.  
The population size variable remains fairly constant at a marginal rate of significance 
for the first half of the periodization, only gaining clear significance for periods starting 
after around 1965; the political instability variable never really attains significance.  
But the most startling result here is the oil dependency dummy, which for the first 
periodizations until around 1960-1989 comes out as very significant, but which then 
rapidly drops off to clear insignificance in later periods.  Neither does this drastic 
change in the significance of an independent variable over different periods of 
absolute time appear that unusual.  Figure 4 replicates this analysis for the main 
variable in Urdal’s study of the impact of demographic youth bulges on the incidence 
of civil war.  In this case, while the youth bulge measure is a consistent and strongly 
significant positive correlate of civil war incidence for all 20-year periods up to around 
1970-1989, in subsequent periods the z-stat drops off sharply and by the last 
periods, the variable is nearing significance as a negative correlate.   
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Figure 3: FL model by rolling 20-year periodization 
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Figure 4: Urdal model by rolling 20-year periodization 
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Table 5 shows the complete results of a slightly different re-test of the Urdal model; 
the first column shows the original model, the second column the model restricted 
only to Cold War era observations and the last column restricted only to post-Cold 
War observations.  There are clearly major differences in the model outcomes, not 
least of which is the main predictor of interest to Urdal, Youth Bulges, which – as we 
might expect given the previous results – is more strongly positively significant in the 
Cold War only model than in the overall model, but is negatively correlated at a weak 
level of significance in the post-Cold War era.  Similarly, the very strong role for total 
population as a predictor vanishes in the post-Cold War era.   
 
Table 5: Urdal re-test by Cold War periodization 
 All Cases Cold War Post-Cold War 
Youth Bulges 0.474 ** 0.120 *** -0.062 * 
 (0.019)  (0.030)  (0.029)  
Total Population 0.204 *** 0.285 *** 0.162  
 (0.057)  (0.072)  (0.094)  
Infant Mortality Rate 0.004 *** 0.007 *** 0.018 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.004)  
Polity Index 0.012  0.036 * -0.028  
 (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.024)  
Polity-squared -0.011 *** -0.004  -0.021 *** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  
Peace Years 1.920 *** 1.672 *** 1.531 *** 
 (0.296)  (0.406)  (0.448)  
Constant -6.870 *** -10.616 *** -3.083 *** 
 (0.874)  (1.347)  (1.167)  
Pseudo R 0.086  0.098  0.129  
N 5331  3865  1466  
 
 
4. Implications: towards a pragmatic, historical empiricism 
 
What should we make of these results?  We do not want to suggest that they 
invalidate the methods or findings of quantitative analysis completely – the bathwater 
may get mucky with the passage of time, but the baby is still quite healthy.  What we 
do want to suggest is that it compels us to be more careful in the way we think about 
quantitative studies, their epistemological underpinnings and their relationship to 
qualitative research.  Earlier, we hinted that quantitative analysis may best be 
conceptualized as a form of historical research, as a kind of systematic, large-N 
comparative study which is located within a more nuanced understanding of the 
passage of time – of, to put it bluntly, history.  This, we want to suggest, drives us 
both towards a more pragmatic (in the philosophical sense) epistemological 
understanding of quantitative studies, and a greater engagement with qualitative 
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literature – something that David Laitin himself calls for but in a slightly different way 
(Laitin 2006).   
 
In fact, this does not entail too radical a shift in our positions, and we think we can 
discern something of what we are advocating in Ted Gurr’s work on Minorities at 
Risk, particularly his quantitative analysis with Will Moore alluded to above (Gurr and 
Moore 1997).  In this article, Gurr and Moore generate a model of ethnic rebellion 
based on the Minorities at Risk data for the 1980s and use this to make ‘predictions’ 
about the groups most likely to rebel in the early 1990s.  With the benefit of hindsight, 
they are then able to compare these predictions against the actual level of rebellion 
among these groups, and discuss reasons why particular groups ‘predicted’ to be 
likely rebels in the early 1990s did not actually rebel.  This might be read as ‘theory-
saving’ post facto excuses, but we suggest a more charitable reading in line with the 
kind of approach we wish to advocate here.   
 
Gurr and Moore, we suggest, can be seen as operating within a fundamentally 
pragmatic social scientific philosophical orientation (Baert 2005; Rorty 1979), in 
which the purpose of the analysis is not to uncover or test ‘universal’ hypotheses 
about the causes of rebellion, but rather to identify time-bounded ‘useful truths’ – 
particular cases and variables based on the systematic analysis of previous 
experience, that may provide insights into potential problem areas in the future.  
Indeed, an imputable underlying philosophical pragmaticism is combined in their 
analysis with a very practical pragmatism about the uses of such forms of enquiry.  
Hence, Gurr and Moore conclude that a ‘general statistical modelling approach 
cannot provide us with predictions of ethnopolitical violence, but coupled with 
monitoring resources, it identifies both risky cases and the variables that need to be 
observed’.  Of course, many subsequent econometric analyses have been 
undertaken with policy implications in mind – Paul Collier’s work, among others, has 
strong links to the World Bank – but the way in which these analyses are undertaken, 
and the generality of the conclusions that are thence derived, betray a far more 
universalist ontological underpinning, as is evidenced by numerous pronouncements 
in Collier’s magisterial Bottom Billion. 
 
Gurr and Moore engage with qualitative assessments of their model’s ‘failures’, then, 
to demonstrate that such models can be pragmatically useful, even if they have 
acknowledged limitations in their scope of applicability.  Similarly, Laitin (2006) shows 
how engagement between quantitative and qualitative analysis can shed new light on 
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orthodox explanations of particular conflicts – in particular, he suggests a novel re-
interpretation of the roots of the Sri Lankan civil war in the light of quantitative 
research on ethnic diversity and conflict.  We find both of these useful approaches, 
but what we want to encourage here is that such engagement should run both ways.  
To do so, we return to the issue alluded to above of what, precisely, the conflict 
‘event’ should be understood as – and hence coded for – in quantitative research. 
 
Our travels through time have driven us to suggest that we need to take a closer look 
at the ‘events’ which constitute our dependent variable.  These various ways of 
looking at this issue of relative time pointed to the initially unsurprising conclusion 
that various forms of political transition – whether the emergence of a new state, a 
sharp transition in polity type, or the end of a civil war – leave a country statistically 
more liable to experience civil war or violent internal conflict in successive years.  
What is perhaps more surprising from these results is the speed of the ‘decay’ of this 
impact, such that within a few years the effect all but evaporates, whatever measure 
one uses.  This, at least, is the usual interpretation of such results.  We want to 
suggest here another, more fundamental, re-interpretation, which can be gained 
through a return to the qualitative narration of the conflict cases underlying these 
datasets.  In particular, these results have suggested that there might be something 
worth examining qualitatively in those cases of conflict ‘onset’ that occur relatively 
soon after the end of a previous conflict episode.   
 
There are 15 conflict onsets in the FL dataset that occur when the ‘New State’ 
dummy is equal to 1.  We do not have the space here, or the in-depth qualitative 
understanding, to consider all these cases.  We will instead simply point to two 
particular cases that we are more familiar with and that raise the issues we are 
concerned with.  Firstly, the outbreak of the civil war in the Southern Philippines.  In 
the FL dataset this outbreak, coded for 1972, ranks as a confirming observation for 
the instability hypothesis, because 1972 coincided with Marcos’ declaration of 
Marshal Law, which is coded in the Polity Index as a drastic change from 2 to -9.  
While the qualitative literature on the conflict certainly affirms that the transition to 
Marshal Law was a major springboard for the escalation of the conflict in the South, it 
is also clear from this literature that the conflict was already pronounced prior to the 
declaration of Marshal Law and, indeed, one of the major justifications given by 
Marcos for his authoritarian turn (aside from the impending end of his constitutionally 
final second term as President) was the instability in the South (McKenna 1998; 
Noble 1981).  At least in the official chronology of the Marcos administration, Fearon 
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and Laitin have got the causality wrong: the cause of the polity transition (read 
‘instability’) was, in fact, the onset of conflict, which simply had not yet reached the 
battle death threshold for their dependent variable.  Secondly, the ‘onset’ of a conflict 
in Indonesia in 1950 can hardly be treated as a separate event from the gaining of 
‘New State’ status in 1949 and 1950, because the rebellion in question – the 
attempted secession of the Republik Maluku Selatan – was essentially a continuation 
of the war of independence by a group that had sided with the Dutch during the war 
and which hence refused to recognize the ‘new’ Indonesian state; it was, in Richard 
Chauvel’s terms, ‘not a revolution, but a counter-revolution’ (Chauvel 1985). 
 
These may seem like minor points – and indeed the omission of all new-state conflict 
onsets from the FL dataset does not affect the other predictors substantially.  But 
what we want to suggest is that the engagement of qualitative and quantitative 
assessments of the passage of time in civil war analysis suggests that the 
quantitative coding for war is simply not sufficiently well operationalized.  In 
particular, while a minimum threshold of battle deaths in one year may provide a 
useful proxy for the onset of a civil war, it is more problematic to see the (sometimes 
brief) absence of such levels of conflict as indicating the ‘end’ of the war, or at any 
rate, the ‘known predisposition thereto’, in Hobbes’ terms.  More prosaically, conflict 
‘events’ which ‘begin’ relatively quickly after the cessation of a previous ‘event’ – 
whether a previous war or regime transition – may not, in fact, be separable ‘events’.  
A similar case can be made with respect to the passage of absolute time, taking, for 
instance, the remarkable loss of significance for the Oil dummy in recent 
periodizations of the FL dataset.  It will only be through engagement with qualitative 
literature, we suggest, that we will be able to understand this trend and feed it back 
into improved quantitative analysis.   
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